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THE NEW DEFINITION OF MURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
DEGREES OF MURDER
At common law there were no degrees of murder, and
the punishment for murder was, in all cases, dfath." The
division of murder into degrees originated in Pennsylvania.2 The second section of the act of April 22d, 1794, entitled "An act for the better prevention of crime, and for
the abolishing of the punishment of death in certain cases,"
divided murder into degrees by declaring that all murder
perpetrated in certain designated ways should be murder
of the first degree and should be punished by death, and
all other kinds of murder should be murder in the second
3
degree, and should be punished by imprisonment.
Clark and Marshall on Crimes, P. 346.
2lark and Marshall, P. 346.
3This statute was the forerunner and furnished the model for
similar legislation in many states. Mikell's Cases on Criminal Law,
P. 360.
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The reason for the passage of this statute, as declared
in its preamble, was that "the several offences which are
included under the general denomination murder differ so
greatly from each other in the degree of atrociousness that
it is unjust to involve them in the same punishment." The
statute, it has been said, "was designed to mitigate the existing rules of the common law, which involved in a common fate convicts almost infinitely separated in the heinousness of their crimes." 4 The legislature, "considering
that there is a manifest difference in the degree of guilt,
where a deliberate intention to kill exists, and where none
appears, distinguished murder into two grades-murder of
the first and murder of the second degree."5
HISTORY OF MURDER
The act of 1794 'completed an interesting cycle of legal history. The term murder is derived from the word
murdrum, which is the Latinised form of the Germanic
word morth. It has had, in course of time, various meanings.
SECRET KILLINGS
It originally denoted a secret killing.7 In the case of
such killings, the dead man was presumed to be a Norman,
unless there was an express "presentment of Englishry,"
and the township in which the killing occurred was fined.
The fine as well as the offence was called murdrum.8 The
presentment that the dead man was an Englishman, called
4

Kelly v. Com. 1 Gr. 484.
SCom. v. Drum 58 Pa. 9. This Is not an entirely accurate statement of the distinction between the two legrees. See infra
6
The word murdrum first appears qn the laws of Edward the

Confessor.

Thorpe, 1., 448; 3 Stephen's History of Criminal Law, P.

25.
7"Morth" means "secret." Its use in the early law was not
confined to homicide, but extended to all secret crimes. It first appears as the name of a kind of homicide in the laws of Aethelstan.

Thorpe, 1., 225; 3 Stephen's. P. 25.
sKenny's Criminal Law, P. 124.
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a presentment of Englishry, freed the township from this
fine.9 The practical distinction between murder and other
forms of homicide was therefore that, in cases of murder,
a presentment of Englishry was required, in the absence
of which the person found killed was presumed to be a
Frenchman (Norman) and the township was fined.
WORST KIND OF HOMICIDES
These fines, which were a remnant of the effects of
the conquest of England by Frenchmen, were formally
abolished by statute in 1340 on the eve of the great war in
which the English conquered France. 10 Indeed, there is
evidence that, prior to the passage of this statute, in the
274 years which had elapsed since the Conquest, the presentment of Englishry, and the meaning of the word murdrum in connection with it, had become almost forgotten.
The abolition of these fines and the presentment of
Englishry removed the distinction between murder and
other forms of homicide, and the word murder necessarily
lost its original meaning. It had, however, become a well
known and popular term, and its use was not discontinued.
It came to be applied to the worst kinds of homicide.,
2
though it had no longer any distinctive meaning.'
At this time, the following classes of homicide seem to
be distinguished:
(1)
Murder, indistinctly conceived
species of the offence.

of

as the

worst

(2) Homicide per infortunium
et se
defendendo,
which, though blamable to some extent, involved no other
consequences than the expense of getting a pardon, forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment before trial.
(3) Justifiable homicide, which entitled a man to be
acquitted.
9As to what constituted Englishry there Is some doubt.
lOl4Edw. 3, st. 1. C. 4.
"'Stephen's General View of the Criminal Law, P. 137.
' 2Kenny, P. 124.
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(4) Homicides which, though they did not belong to
the worst class of all, were neither justifiable nor cases of
misfortune or self defence, were distinguished by no particular name, but were capital felonies, though not called
murders.1 8
MALICE AFORETHOUGHT
The next step in the history of murder consists in the
adoption of the expression "malice aforethought" as the
specific distinction between murder and other forms of
homicide.
This expression, which had been in use since the 13th
century, even before the abolition" of Englishry, was first
employed by juries in finding special verdicts of self-defence. In order to entitle a man to a pardon on the ground
that he had committed a homicide in self-defence, it was
necessary for the jury to find that he committed it "in
self-defence, and not by felony or malice aforethought.","
UNPARDONABLE

HOMICIDES

The term "malice aforethought" later came to be used
as a test for certain unpardonable homicides. In 1389, the
King upon the petition of the Commons, because the pardoning power was much abused, declared that a general
pardon should not constitute a defence for murder committed by assault, waylaying, or malice prepense. In order that a pardon might be a defence in such cases, it must
have stated that the murder was by assault, waylaying or
malice prepense.
This was the first statutory recognition of the term
"malice aforethought," which had been previously employed by juries in finding special verdicts of se defendendo.
The statute was an indirect statutory definition of murder,
3

1 Stephen's History of Criminal Law, P. 41.
143 Stephen, P. 41.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

and, after 1389, murder might have been defined as a kind
of homicide in defence of which a pardon in general terms
could not be pleaded. 15
UNCLERGYABLE HOMICIDES
The distinction between a killing with malice aforethought and other killings was accentuated and made the
specific difference between murder and other forms of
homicide by the statutes which excluded murderers from
the benefit of clergy. There were four of these statutes
passed between 14966 and 1547.17
The words used in these statutes were "wilfully prepensed murder," "prepensed by murder," "murder upon
malice prepensed," "murder of malice prepensed," and "wilful murder of malice prepensed." After the passage of
these statutes, the term murder soon became limited, as it
still is, to the form of homicide dealt with by the statutesa killing with malice aforethought.'
The result of these acts was to divide homicide as follows:
(1) Murder, killing with malice aforethought-a felony without benefit of clergy.
(2) Wilful homicide without malice aforethought,
then and since called manslaughter-a clergyable felony.
(3) Homicide in self-defence or by misadventure,
which included many cases of what are now called involuntary manslaughter-not a felony, but requiring a pardon
and involving forfeiture of chattels.
(4) Justifiable homicide, which was not criminal at
all.19
The present definition of murder was therefore settled
by the year 1547, but the questions, What amounts to
"'malice"? and, What is meant by "aforethought"? were
5

'1 Stephen's General View of the Criminal Law. P. 139.
1612 Henry VII. C. 7.
'171 Edw. VI. C. 1, 2, 7, 10.
'SKenny, p. 124.
9
' Stephen's General View of the Criminal Law, P. 40.
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not decided until a long time afterwards. The subsequent
history of the definition of murder consists mainly, though
not entirely, of the process by which a definite meaning
was given to these words:
UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDES
The words "malice aforethought," used in the statutes
which excluded murders from benefit of clergy, were at
first construed in their popular sense, and required, at
20
least, that the killing should be intentional.
The forensic experience of successive generations disclosed many cases of homicide which, though not resulting from a desire to kill, were considered heinous enough
to deserve the full penalties of murder. These accordingly,
one after another, were brought within the definition of
that offence by a wide judicial construction of its language.
MALICE AFORETHOUGHT
The expression "malice aforethought" has therefore
become merely a convenient comprehensive expression by
which to describe all the various states of mind and circumstances that are considered so heinous that a homicide
produced by any of them will be murder. It means a killing with any one of the following states of mind:
(1) An intention to kill.
(2) An intention to inflict great bodily harm.
(3) An intention to do an act which will probably
kill or do great bodily harm, without any intention of causing death or inflicting great bodily harm.
(4) An intention to commit a felony.
(5) An intention to oppose any officer of justice in
21
discharging certain of his duties.
It has therefore been truly said that the term "malice
aforethought" is now only an arbitrary symbol. For the
malice may have in it nothing really malicious; and need
Stephen, P. 47; Kenny, P. 132.
lSee Clark and Marshall, P. 325 et seq. for extended explana-

203

2

tion.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

never be aforethought, except that every desire must necessarily come before-though perhaps only an instant before-the act which is desired. The word "aforethought"
has thus become either false or else superfluous. The word
"malice" is neither; but it is apt to be misleading, for it
is not employed in its original (and its popular) meaning.22
The relevancy of this history of murder is simply this:
It shows that the definition of murder was judically extended to include certain unintentional killings because the
judges thought that they were as heinous as intentional
killings and deserved the same punishment; and that later
murder was divided into degrees by statute because the legislators thought that these same unintentional killings were
not as heinous as intentional killings and did not deserve
the same punishment.
THE ACT OF 1923
The commissioners appointed in 1859 to revise the
criminal laws of the state were of the opinion that the act
of 1794 "had been so thoroughly considered and its construction and meaning so entirely settled by a long course
of judicial decision" that it was "inexpedient to attempt any
important alteration thereof." As a consequence, upon their
recommendation, it was reenacted by the legislature as section seventy-four of the act of March 31st, 1860.23 This
act, and its predecessor 24 have also furnished the model for
the classification of murder in many other states. Nevertheless, in 1923, the legislature thought it desirable to
amend it. It now reads as follows:
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of or attempting to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping shall be
22Kenny, P. 132.
23p. L. 382.
24Act of April 22d, 1794, 3 Sm L. 186.
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deemed murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of
25
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree.
The changes made in the statute, as indicated by the
black type, are:
(1) The substitution of the word "attempting" for
the word "attempt."
(2) The crimes are called murder in the first degree
and murder in the second degree, instead of murder of the
26
first degree and murder of the second degree.
(3) The insertion of the crime of kidnapping.
The first two changes are probably merely formal and
unimportant. The third is substantial and important. Before considering its meaning and effect, it is well to consider briefly the meaning and effect of the statute in general.
EFFECT ON DEFINITION OF MURDER
The statute does not define murder or change the definition of murder. It makes nothing murder which would
not be murder in absence of the statute; nor does it make
anything which would be murder without the statute less
than murder; and as, in Pennsylvania, it is only by the
common law that murder is defined, 27 it follows that:

(1) Murder in the first degree plus murder in the
second degree equals murder at common law.
(2) Murder at common law minus murder in the first
degree equals murder in the second degree.
Indeed, as the statute, after defining murder in the
first degree, simply declares that "all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree," it is
25

Act of May 22d, 1923, P. L. 306.
26Under the act of 1794, the crimes were murder of the first and
murder in the second degree. Under the act of 1860, they were
murder of the first degree and murder of the second degree.
27C. v. Exior 243 Pa. 19. Section 87 of the fact of March 31, 1860
makes an act which, in some cases, was murder at common law,
a felony of less grade. C. v. Railing 113 Pa. 37. The act of May
19th, 1923. P. L. 283 makes certain conduct murder.
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necessary to solve the second equation in order to ascertain
what murder in the second degree is.

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
The statute apparently declares that four classes of
murders shall be murder in the first degree:
(1) Murders by poison.
(2) Murders by lying in wait.
(3) Wilful, deliberate and premeditate murders.
(4) Murders in the perpetration of or attempting to
perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping.
MURDERS BY POISON
The statute declares, not that all killings by poison,
but that all murders by poison, shall constitute murder in
the first degree. Therefore one who gave poison to another believing it to be sugar, or who administered poison
to another as a medicine and without negligence, would
not be guilty of murder in the first degree if the poison
caused death, because his conduct did not constitute murder at common law.2
Furthermore, a killing by poison, in order to constitute
murder in the first degree, must be intentional-wilful, deliberate and premeditated.2 9 The statute classes murder
by poison with "other" kinds of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and it is implied that only such killings
by poison as result from a specific intent to kill are murder in the first degree. A killing caused by poison administered with the intention of causing a transient and, tho
disagreeable or even dangerous, not a fatal illness, would
not be murder in the first degree. 0
28Trickett's Criminal Law, P. 769.
29McMeen v. c. 114 Pa. 300.
3
OTrickett, P. 770. But see contra, S. v. Wills. 61 Ia. (329, 17, N.
W. 90, 35 L. R. A. N. S. 624.
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MURDERS BY LYING IN WAIT
Lying in wait involves watching and secrecy. 31 It
consists of concealment for the purpose of taking the vic32

tim unawares.

The statute, however, declares, not that all killings
by lying in wait, but that all "murder" by lying in wait
shall constitute murder in the first degree. It follows that
a killing by lying in wait does not constitute murder in the
first degree unless it would have been murder at common
law.
Furthermore, a killing by lying in wait in order to be
murder in the first degree must be intentional-wilful, deliberate and premeditated.33 Murders by lying in wait are
mentioned merely as instances of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killings. It is possible for one to lie in wait
for another in order to interview him, to scare him, or to
punish him slightly. An unintended killing would not be
murder in the first degree simply because it occurred after
the perpetrator had lain in wait.3 4
WILFUL, DELIBERATE AND PREMEDITATED
MURDERS
There is considerable confusion in the cases as to the
meaning of the expression "any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," but there seems to be
no disagreement upon the following points:
(1) The words are not to be construed ejusdem
generis so as to be applicable only to acts of the same characte'r as poisoning and lying in wait.3 5
(2) The word "wilful" means, not merely that the act
which caused death was intended, but that the mortal ef31C. v. Gibson 275 Pa. 138.
32C. V. Mulferno 265 Pa. 247.
33C. c. Mondollo 247 Pa. 526.
3
4Trickett, P. 769. There axe cases contra in other jurisdictions,
on the theory that there is a conclusive presumption of intention
from the means used. 29 C. J. 1111.
35p. v. Venunzo 212 Mich. 472, 180 N. W. 502.
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fect of the act was intended. A wilful killing is the intentional doing of an act with the further intention of causing
death. It is the intention to cause death which makes the
act a wilful killing. 36
(3) No particular time is prescribed as prerequisite
3 7
to permit the required premeditation and deliberation.
The statute qualifies the killings which are murder in
the first degree by three words: wilful, deliberate, and
premeditated. An effort is made in some of the cases to
assign to each of these words a distinct meaning. 38 The
present doctrine is that the words are synonymous, and
mean simply that the killing must be intentional. The
"true criterion" of murder in the first degree "is the intent
to take life."3 9 The deliberation and premeditation required
are deliberation and premeditation enough to form this intent and not upon the intent after it is formed. 40 If an intent to kill is shown, the deliberation and premeditation
are ipso facto discovered because they always exist when
the intent exists.
MURDERS IN THE PERPETRATION OF FELONIES
The act of 1794, and its successor, the act of 1860, declared that a murder should be murder in the first degree if
it was committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary. At common
law a killing committed in the perpetration of any felony was murder, even though there was no intent to
kill or inflict bodily harm and the act done was
one of which death was not a natural and probable
36Weston v. C: iiI Pa. 251; C. v. Echerd 174 Pa. 137.
3729 C. J. 1113, Trickett, P. 790.
3SThe most well known and futile attempt is that of Judge Agnew in C. v. Drum 58 Pa. 9. It is much to be deprecated that in
reading this opinion many lawyers and judges have mistaken eloquence of language for perspicacity of mind and perspicuity of expression.
39C. v. Reed 234 Pa. 573.
40C. v. Dreher 274 Pa. 325, C. v. Daynarowicz 275 Pa- 235.
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consequence. 41 It follows that a killing committed in the
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies is murder in the first degree although there
was no intention to kill or inflict great bodily harm and
death or great bodily harm was not a natural consequence
of the act done.. 42 This is true altho the person killed was
not the intended victim of the felony,4" and the act causing death was done, not by the defendant, but by a con44
federate in the commission of the felony
CLASSES OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
It follows that, in reality, there are only two classes of
murder which constitute murder in the first degree:
(1) Intentional murders.
(2) Murders committed in the commission of the
enumerated felonies or in attempts to commit them.
Murder of the first degree requires that the death produced by the criminal act shall have been intended,
except when it occurs in the commission of or attempt to
commit the enumerated crimes. This intention to kill is
required in the poisoning and lying in wait cases, for these
cases are mentioned merely as special instances of "wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated killings."
MURDERS 1N KIDNAPPING
The act of 1923 added kidnapping to the felonies in
the perpetration of which an unintentional killing shall be
murder in the first degree. This addition was made as the
legislative reaction to a very atrocious case without any
consideration of its meaning or the extent of its application.
It gives rise to the following questions:
41Clark and Marshall, 1?. 340. For the origin of this doctrine,
see 3 Stephen, P. 57. For criticism of the doctrine, see Stroud's.
Mens Rea, P. 168.
4ZC. v. Flanagan 3 W. & S. 415; C. v. Lessner 274 Pa. 110, 21.
Mich. L. R. 95. 36 H. L. R. 222.
43C. V. Major 198 Pa. 200.
44C. v. Biddle 200 Pa. 640.
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(1) What is kidnapping?
(2) When is a killing committed in the perpetration
of kidnapping murder in the first degree?
(3) When is a killing committed in the perpetration
of or in attempting to perpetrate kidnapping?
WHAT IS KIDNAPPING?
Kidnapping is a misdemeanor at common law, and is
usually defined as the forcible abduction or stealing away
of a man, woman or child from their own country and sending them into another. 45 There is, however, authority to
another counthe effect that sending the person taken into 46
crime.
the
of
element
essential
try is not an
It is not clear from the authorities whether the common law crime of kidnapping exists in Pennsylvania, or,
if it does, what its definition is.4

It has, however, been

stated that section ninety-four of the act of March 31, 1860,
defines "the offense known and punished by the common
law as kidnapping."48
The act of February 25th, 1875, 49 was intended as an
50
addition to the act of 1860; and the act of April 4, 1901,
repealing all inconsistent acts, is entitled "An act to punish kidnappers, their, aiders, assistants, and abettors." The
offenses defined by these statutes are not precisely the
same as the crime of kidnapping at common law; and the
law crime and
effect of these statutes upon the common
51
decided.
been
not
has
upon each other
It is therefore impossible to know what the crime of
kidnapping is at present in Pennsylvania; but it seems
that, whatever may be the present definition of the crime,
45Clark and Marshall, P.
2 D. & C. 115.
4624 Cyc. 797.

302; 8 R. C. L.

296; C. v. Eshelman

47See C. v. Eshelman, C. v. Neuhauser 47 C. C. 474; C. v. Francis 53 Super. 278; Burns v. C. 129 Pa. 138; C. v. Myers 146 Pa. 24.
48Burns v. C. 129 Pa. 138.
49p. L.

382.

5op. L. 65.
5
lSee C. v. Eshelman; C. v. Neuhauser; C. v. Francis.
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the term "kidnapping" as used in the act of 1923 must be
construed as referring exclusively to kidnapping at common law.52 The questions still remain: What is the common law definition of kidnapping in Pennsylvania? Does
it require a taking into another state? If so, is the killing
of a person stolen in another state, by an act done after
the person has been brought into Pennsylvania, murder
in the first degree in Pennsylvania? 53 Obviously the
death of a kidnapped person in Pennsylvania by an act
done in another state would not be murder in the first degree in Pennsylvania; but, under the fourty-seventh section of the act of March 31st, 1860,' 4 the killing of a kidnapped person in Pennsylvania, by an act done in Pennsylvania could be punished in Pennsylvania even though
the death occurred in another state.
HOMICIDES IN KIDNAPPING
The murder must be committed in the perpetration of
or attempting to perpetrate kidnapping. It is therefore
necessary to consider:
(1) The beginning of responsibility,
(2) The termination of responsibility,
for murder in the first degree because of the statute.
This responsibility begins as soon as the actor's conduct in pursuance of his intention to kidnap is sufficiently
proximate to the kidnapping to constitute an attempt to
kidnap. The subject is therefore involved in the very difficult subject of attempts, which has never been discussed
by our courts in a satisfactory manner. The difficulty of
deciding what constitutes an attempt to kidnap appears
from the examination of the discussion in the cases of
52C. v. Exler 243 Pa. 159. This case so defined the term "rape"
as used in the act of 1860, and the sarae reasorning is applicable to
the term
"kidnapping."
53 It has been held that acts done in another state may be considered in determining the character of a homicide. Jackson V. C.
100 Ky. 339, 38 S. W. 422.
54p. L. 427.
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what constitute attempts to commit other crimes. 55 The
subject has never been scientifically considered by our
courts, and no satisfactory rule by which to determine when
action aimed at the commission of a crime becomes an attempt to commit that crime.
The murder must be committed during the commission
of kidnapping, and it would seem therefore that it must
be committed before the kidnapping has been completed.
But when is a kidnapping completed? Is it complete as
soon as the taking occurs?
Or is it complete only after
there has been some, the slightest, carrying away? Or is
it incomplete until the destination originally determined
upon has been reached? Or is it incomplete until another
state has been entered?
Or does the crime continue as
long as the victim is detained by the kidnappers?"
It seems, however, that the fact that the kidnapping
is technically complete when the killing occurs is immaterial. In construing the statute, with reference to the
other crimes enumerated, it has been held sufficient, although the crime was technically complete, if the homicide was committed before the actor left the premises
where the felony was committed or attempted. Thus, after a person has entered a dwelling house, the crime of
burglary is complete. Being in the house as a result of
entering is not strictly a part of the crime. Nevertheless,
if a homicide is committed by a burglar while he is in the
house, he is guilty of murder in the first degree. 57 It has
even been held that a person is engaged in the commission
of a felony while he is fleeing to escape, even though he
55See C. v. Eagen 190 Pa. 10; Kelly v. C. 1 Gr. 484; C. v. Puretta

74 Super. 463.
561t has been held that larceny is a cont5nuing crime during
the time the thieves are in the possession of the property, so that
a killing by the thieves the morning after the theft but while they
were still in the possession of the stolen property was a killing in
the prepetrafion of larceny, S. v. Daniels (Wash.) 205 1ac. 1054.
57C. v. Biddle, 200 Pa. 640; C. v. Bodner, 16 D. R. 34. But see
C. v. Major, 198 Pa. 290.
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has left the premises.58 This rule has been applied where
the killing occurred a mile away from the place where the
felony was attempted. 59
MURDERS IN FIRST DEGREE IN KIDNAPPING
At common law kidnapping was a misdemeanor, and
therefore a killing committed in the perpetration of kidnapping was not murder, unless there was an intention to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm or unless an act was done
the natural and probable consequence of which was death
or great bodily harm. 60 Since a killing in order to be murder in the first degree must have been murder at common
law, it would seem to follow that a killing committed in
the perpetration of kidnapping is murder in the first degree only if there was an intention to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm or death or great bodily harm was the natural
and probable consequence of the act done.
It may be aigued that any killing in the perpetration
of a statutory felony was murder at common law, 6' and, as
kidnapping, so-called, has been made a felony by the act
of 1901, a killing in the commission of this crime would be
murder at common law, and therefore would be murder in
the first degree under the act of 1923. This argument overlooks the fact that the word "kidnapping" in the act of 1923
must be construed as meaning kidnapping at common law
and not as meaning the crime defined by the act of 1901.
In criticism of the common law, it is said that its rules
are pro re nata, and that, as a consequeuce, the common
law is unscientific and disorderly.
Certainly the same
thing may be truthfully said of the statutory law, and the
common law rules at least have the merit of fitting the
cases for which they were devised.
-Walter
8

Harrison Hitchler.

5 See C. v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 110.
59
Francis v. S.. 104 Nev. 5, 17 N. W. 675.
60
Clark and Marshall, p. 325.
6
lClark and Marshall, p. 342.
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MOOT COURT
EMiETT VS. JACKSON
Set-off by Member of Partnership of a Partnership Debt Against
an Individual Claim Against Him-Consent of Partner
Essential-Equality of Claims Not Essential89 Pa. 392 and 65 Super. 357 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Emmet is suelng on a note for $250. Jackson in his affidavit
of defense alleged that he and one Jenkins were partners, and that
Emmet owed the firm $450, and that he with Jenkins' consent elected to set-off so much of the debt as equaled the claim sued upon.
The court has given judgment for the plaintiff for $250 and interest.
Defendant appeals, claiming the court erred In not granting the setoff.
Hallem, for Plaintiff.
Bradway, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Auker, J. The single question which presents itself for solution
Is: Can a debt due two or more joint obligees be set-off In an action
on one of the 'obligee's individual note? The plaintiff thru an ingenious argument seeks to sustain his ground by bringing the case
within the Partnership Act of 1915. Upon examining the act we
can find nothing in its provisions that touches the case at bar.
Section V of the act says, "In any case not provided for in this act
the rules of law and equity including the law merchant shall govern." However, we are not compelled to rely on that provision for
solution of the present question. The late case of Mitz vs. Tri.
County Natural Gas Company in 259 Pa. 477, holds that, "One of
two joint obligees, with the consent of the other may use the obligation as an equitable defense In an action by the obligor against
one of them alone." This same doctrine was likewise held in 22 Pa.
35, Smith and Co. vs. Myler and Aber. We believe that the case at
bar comes directly under the doctrine as cited in the above cases,
and deem it sufficient authority to say that the set off should be
allowed.
In Hibert vs. Lang 165 Pa. 439, which was an action similar to
the present one, the court held, "wherever there is practicability of
avoiding circuity of action and needless costs, with safety and con-
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venience to all and no equities of third parties to be Injured a setoff will be allowed on general principles, though the case does not
come within the statute." It appears then, that before set-off is
allowed two things must concur, (1) there must be no equities of
third parties that will be injured thereby, (2) the obliges against
whom the action is brought must get the consent of the co-obligee
or obligees. We fail to see In the case at bar any equities of third
parties that will be injured, none appearing; and the facts show
that Jackson had the consent of his partner Jenkins to use the
joint claim as a set-off in the action against himself.
One of the earliest cases deciding this question is that of
Crist vs. Brindle, 2 Rawle 121. which held that joint obligors on
a bond given to an executor for a debt due to the testator may setoff a debt due by testator to one of them, he being the principal
and the other a surety. Ten years later in Tustin vs. Cameron 5
Wharton 379, we find the same doctrine held. "In an action on a
promissory note given by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff,
defendant may set-off a debt due by plaintiff to a company or partnership of which the defendants were members, the other members
of the company or partnership giving their consent." The court
in this case went on to say that, "an Increasing liberality has
greatly, but cautiously, and beneficially enlarged the doctrine within a few years past."And that the doctrine has been strictly adhered to to the present day we learn from the cases as cited above.
The plaintiff in his second argument maintains that the plaintiff's consent to set-off is needed. While this seems to be the doctrine In the majority of jurisdictions it is not the law in Penna. and
hence not applicable to the case at bar.
We must reverse the decision of the court below in not allowing the set-off and grant the appeal asked for by the defendant.
Decree so entered.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The able and carefully constructed opinion of the learned
court below renders extensive discussion by us unnecessary.
It is not necessary that the debt to two or more, A and B,
should be assigned by A and B, or by B to A, entitled him to set
the debt off against a claim by a creditor of A. Montz vs. Morris,
89 Pa. 392, Edelman vs. Scholl, 65 Super. 357. The consent, otherwise expressed, of the associate of the defendant, to his use of
the joint claim as a set-off is sufficient.
Nor is it necessary that the debt to be set-off should be equal
to, or less than, the plaintiff's claim; and so much of it as equals
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that claim may be used as neutralizing it. In Larkin vs. Cameron,
5 Wharton 379 only a fraction of the debt due by the plaintiff to
the defendant and his partner, was absorbed in the extinction of
the plaintiff's claim.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

HAM!IOND
AVilIs--Misdescription

in,

v.

DRUMMOND

Will-Parole

plain Misdescription-277

Evidence

Allowed

to

B)x-

Pa. 204 Followed

STATEMENT OF FACTS
One Hammond died and left a will in which he devised "my
house and lot, No. 4 East Louther street, Shippensburg," to Hammond. He owned a house and lot, No. 4 West Louther street,
Shippensburg. The plaintiff is the devisee. This is ejectment.
Bertman, for Plaintiff.
Bielkowsky, for Defendant.
OPINION

OF THE COURT

Claster, J. This action of ejectment is instituted by the devisee
under the will of the testator, who claims title to the premises under the will. The defendant claims the premises as the heir at
law of the deceased. This action Is sought to be sustained on the
theory that the will contained a latent ambiguity and that the
plaintiff received title to the premises under the will of the testator.
This theory is met by that of the defendant, who arkues that the
plaintiff did not get title to the premises at No. 4 West Louther
street, because the will contained a devise of the premises at No.
4 East Louther street.
The will provides for a devise to the plaintiff of the testator's
house and lot at No. 4 Fast Louther street. The testator did not
own a house and lot at No. 4 East Louther street but at No. 4
West Louther street.
The testator by making a will intended not to die intestate,
but to give certain property which he described as No. 4 East
Louther street to the plaintiff, The testator Intended to give the
plaintiff the premises at No. 4 West Louther street.
The will does not contain a latent ambiguity.
Clearly upon
the face of the will there Is no ambiguity whatever, because the
testator devised a definite property at No. 4 East Louther street.
The will contains a mistake on the part of the testator.

Looking
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at the face of the will we must interpret it that the testator being
of sound mind, gave to the plaintiff, property which he knew he
did not own. He knew he did not own the home and lot on No. 4
East Louther street, because his only property was on West Louther street.
Were the will construed in this way, it would be an absurdity
and Pennsylvania courts attempt not to reach absurd decisions.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the deceased died intestate as to the property on West Louther street. There is a rule
of law that the courts will not look with favor on construction of a
will which leads to intestacy. 221 Pa. 201, 249 Pa. 259.
Although the counsel for the defendant contends that there
is an established rule of law, that parol evidence is not admissable
to supply or contradict the words of a will, or to explain the intention of the testator when the words used are unambiguous and intelligible, it was held in 76 Pa. 197, 3 Watts 385; 240; 40 Cyc. 1444;
that for the purpose of explanation, evidence may be introduced
to show what land the testator owned in order to show a mistake
in description, number or designation of a lot.
It has also been held in 262 Pa. 62 and 229 Pa. 349 that, "evidence is admissible against a will from necessity to explain that
which would be otherwise without operation."
In conclusion, we find that at the time the will was made, the
testator being of sound mind, intended to devise the property on
West Louther street, but due to a mistake% he wrote East Louther
street. He could not devise property which he did not own and did
not intend to do so.
In view of the authorities cited above we feel contrained to
deny the defendant's right of possession. We therefore issue a
writ of ejectment to the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Louther street east of street X, which crossed it at right-angles, was known as East Louther street; and west of street X, West
Louther street. Hammond owned a house and lot at No. 4 West
Louther street. He made a will in which he devised "my house
and lot, No. 4 East Louther street," to Hammond, the plaintiff, who
is asserting ownership -under this devise to house and lot, No. 4
West Louther street. Did the devise apply to these premises?
This is not a case of ambiguity. No phrase is used which is
susceptible of two meanings. Hence parole evidence cannot be
received for the purpose of resolving a latent ambiguity.
There is rather a misdescription of the premises
intended.
Much of the description is correct; viz. house and lot, No. 4, Lou-
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ther street, Shippensburg. But West, qualifying Louther street, is
erroneous. While wills must be in writing, there are cases in which
the interpretation and application of the will may be effected by the
aid of facts disclosed by oral evidence extraneous to the will. The
description is in part mistaken. Enough remains of the description
to justify the emendation of the will, by the substitution of West for
East in it. The other elements are correct. The necessity of the alteration is the want of ownership of the lot at 4 East Louther street,
and the ownership of the lot at 4 West Louther street. The maXimum "falsa demonstratio non nocet" is applicable because it is discoverable what the testator must have intended from the description given, aided by the extraneously revealed facts. Cf. Brooklyn
Trust Co. vs. Warrington, 277 Pa. 204, and cases cited by the learned
court below, whose judgment is affirmed.

COMMIONWEALTH VS.

CARSON

Witnesses-Impeachment of a Disappointing Witness-Relevancy of
"No

Knowledge"

Testimony-Justice of Peace as

a Witness to Testimony Before Him
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

X had accused Carson before a
Indictment
for
robbery.
Justice of the Peace who had held him for court. An Indictment
followed, on the testimony before the grand jury of A and B. At
the trial, the district attorney called X, expecting him to repeat
what he had sworn to before the Justice. Instead of so testifying, he testified that he had no knowledge whatever of Carson being guilty. The district attorney then called as a witness the Justice, despite objection of defendant, to testify to what X had said
before him.

Conviction.

Motion for new trial.

Mundy, for Plaintiff.
Silverstein, for Defendant.
OPINION
Croop, J.

OF THE COURT

The error alleged In the case at bar is the allowing

of the Justice to testify to X's statements made before him. The
question for us decide is, whether a Justice of the Peace can be
called to prove contradictory statements made by a witness at a
former hearing before him.
In 40 Cyc. p. 2692, section 7, the rule Is well stated thus: "Experience has shown that the tendency of the rule against show-
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Ing contradictory statements of one's own witness is to place a
party at the mercy of designing and perhaps hostile witnesses by
whom he may be surprised and entrapped, and according to the
great weight of authority, a party who has been thus deceived by
his own witness may prove that such witness has made prior
statements contradictory to his testimony." The law in Pennsylvania is in accord with the weight of authority and fortunately,
for this prolbits entrapment and aids in the administration of
Justice.
The following Pennsylvania cases have held this rule:
1 Brown
Ct. 305.

176; 2 Brewster

656; 3 Brewster

402; 20 Pa. Super.

It is sometimes argued that a Justice should produce his records. This rule has no foundation since a Justice's court is not
a court of record. And the law does not require a Justice to keep
records and it is not the custom for these courts to do so.
Since Justice's courts do not ordinarily keep records, the Justice's
testimony as to what took place in his court is the best evidence
possible.
In 40 Cyc. p. 2748, section B', we find the rule: "It is not necessary to have resort either to the stenographer or to his minutes,
or to the testimony of an official but any person who was present
at the trial or hearing and heard the testimony of the witness, is
competent to testify to what was stated by the witness.
In Payne vs. State 66 Ark. 545 the court held "That a Magistrate before whom testimony was taken, the clerk who took it
down, or any other witness who was present and heard it, is competent to prove what the statements were."
This rule has been followed in;
119 Ga. 467; 144 Ill. App. 198; 239 Ill. App. 621; 172 Ind. 357; 78
Iowa 432; 54 N. H. 465; 60 N. Y. 463; 25 Gratt 921; 15 Whsh. 418.
In Commonwealth vs. Marrow and Dougherty, 8 Philadelphia
440, the facts were analogous to those in the case at bar. In that
case the witness gave testimony under oath before the Mayor and
when called upon by the Commonwealth at the trial of the prisoner
for murder he proved hostile. The Mayor was called and allowed
to testify to the contradictory statements of the witness. He also
was allowed to state what the witness saAd at the previous hearing.
In 259 Pa. 272 it was held that it was discretionary on the part
of the trial judge and that it was not error to permit the district
attorney to offer testimony as to what a witness' previous state-

DICKINSON LAW REVIMW

ments had been.

It

is admittbd for the purpose of neutralizing the

effect of his testimony.
To introduce former evidence, It is sufficient that the substance or even the effect of the former testimony can be given
by the reporting witness. Pennsylvania courts do not require a
strict adherence to what was said by the witness, provided it appears that a substantially correct report of his testimony is given.
Helper vs. Mt. Carmel Savings Bank, 97 Pa. 420.
Wolf vs. Wgeth 11 S. & R. 149.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Reeves 267 Pa. 361 the facts
are similar to the facts at bar. In that case the defendant was
being tried for a felony and the witness had testified before a
coroner, and at the trial his testimony on the same point was
directly in conflict with his former testimony. The rule laid down
by the court dn this case was--"The rule that a party calling a
witness is not permitted to ask leading questions, and is bound by
his testimony, is liberally construed in modern practice. It apparently proceeds upon the theory that a rigid adherence in practice in the ordinary cases would be mala fide to the tribunal, and
the weight of authority is in favor of the rule that where a party
is surprised in the testimony of a witness unexpectedly turning
hostile, counsel may exercise the right of cross-examination of the
witness. Such exceptions have been recognized in Pennsylvania,
and are permitted to prevent failure of justice. Whether such
practice will be permitted, is within sound discretion of the court,
and its action will not be reversed by the appellate court unless
there is an abuse of that discretion In permitting the testimony."
This case further held "that the court did not abuse its discretion
in permitting the Commonwealth to call the coroner as a witness."
In view of the foregoing authorities we find that'there was no
error in admitting the testimony of the Justice. Motion for new
trial dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME) COURT
called a. a witness, testifies that he has no knowledge that
Carson is guilty. Then his testimony can offer no basis for the
conviction of Carson.
What is the utility of proof that on another occasion he had
sworn that Carson was guilty? It would show the untrustworthiness of X as a witness, but what is the use of that? Let him be
ever so untrustworthy, are we to transmute his testimony that he
does not know of Carson's guilt into evidence that he does know?
He has said, under oath. that he does not know. He furnishes no
If the testimony
evidence for or against the defendant's guilt.
X,
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before the Justice was that Carson was guilty, that testimony
cannot be used to prove his guilt. To prove the inconsistency,
the Incredibility of X, is entirely irrelevant.
The district attorney may feel chargin at having called a witness who does not support his cause but the practice before the
court is not to be shaped so as to alleviate this chargin.
If X had positively damaged the cause of the prosecuton by
evidence favorable to the defendant, it would be desirable to lessen
the weight of this testimony, and the district attorney might expose the inconsistency between the present and the former statements of the witness.
In Sturgis vs. State, 20 Okl. Cr. 302, Wignore's Cases, page
347, one of the conditions prescribed for the privilege of showing
that a disappointing witness has. previously made an inconsistent
statement is that he "must have testified to facts injurious to the
party call.ng him."
In some of the Pennsylvania cases the principle is latent.
In Commonwealth vs. O'Donnell, 71 Super. 80,
Henderson, J., observes that the testimony of the witness impeached
"tended to show that the offence was not committed by the defendant." In Commonowealth vs. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, Kephart, J.,
remarks that the witness' testimony "was directly opposed to that
given in his former testimony." Precisely what a direct opposition
was, we do not know. Perhaps at the trial he said that the defendant was not guilty, or stated facts inimical to thq theory of
guilt. In Commonwealth vs. Wickett, 20 Super. 350, a forgery
of a note case, the witness whose name was on the note as maker,
said, on the witness-stand, that he had signed the note. He had
previously said that the signature was forged. In Commonwealth
vs. Marrow & Dougherty, 8 Phila. 440, the witness had previously
averred that-the defendants were guilty. At the trial he denied
their guilt.
Of much of the opinion of the learned court below we must
approve. The justice was not incompetent to prove what the witness had said before him; but the testimony before him was Irrelevant. Proof of it could subserve no proper purpose.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
HOFFMAN VS. HARRISON
Contracts--Fraud-Bailment Sale--Recission of Sale for Frd-Sec.
49 Sales Act-22 Super. 164 Criticised
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff negotiated with defendant for the sale of an automobile to thd latter, under a bailment contract which provided
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for the payment of moneys periodically.
$100 was paid by the
defendant on the car as the first installment and nothing since.
Defendant was given the car for three weeks trial before any contract of sale was negotiated.
Title was to rest in defendant
buyer when the last installment had been paid. Defendant refused to pay any of the remaining installments, or to restore
the car to the vendor.
Wayne, for Plaintiff.
Irwin, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Yergey, J.
The case is one of replevin by the plaintiff and Is by no means
an uncommon one. To accept an article, put it to use and then
claim it was not the one contracted for, as an excuse for non-payment and for retaining possession, would certainly be adverse to
any law both civil and moral. See. 49, of the Uniform Sales Act
covers the case to the very point.
It provides that-"If,
after
acceptance of the goods, the buyer falls to give notice to the seller
of any breach of a promise or warranty within a reasonable time,
after the buyer knows or ought to know of such breach, the seller
shall not be liable therefore." Certainly the defendant knew or
ought to have discovered the defect ot which he has complained
before his installment became due. If it were not the car he contracted to buy his remedy was for fraud and rescission of the whole
contract. In Wood vs. Wood 263 Pa. 521 the rule was laid down,
that: "where a party desires to rescind upon the ground of mistake
or fraud, he must, upon discovery of the facts, at once announce
his purpose and adhere to it.
If he is silent and continues to treat
the property as his own, he will be held to have waived the objection, and will be conclusively bound by the contract as if the mistake or fraud had not occurred."
Therefore I think that an action of replevin will lie Inasmuch as it is strictly a possessory
action, and lies only on behalf of the one entitled to possession.
Plaintiff has a right of immediate possession as soon as default
has been made, and the defendant thereby loses any right of set
off or recoupment. 22 Pa. Sup. 528, 53 Sup. 316 so hold as to setoff. Recoupment may lie where there has been a breach of warranty plus evidence tendency to show that the defendant has suffered damages which In the contemplation of the parties, or according to the natural or usual course of things, where the consequences of the breach of warranty, or fraudulent representations,
120 U. S. 648. However, the court did not reverse the decision
on this ground or allow recoupment but merely set aside the verdict
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and ordered a

new trial.

In

the case before us however no

jury was proven by the defendant
case of 120 U.

and since the decision in

inthe

S. 648 which is a Pa. case, has been decided, our

statutes have entirely changed the law as shown In Sec. 49 of the
Sales Act.

We therefore think that replevin will lie and the de-

fendant is ordered to return the automobile to the plalntlff.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

Harrison agreed to buy an automobile which we shall call X.
He tried X and was satisfied with it.

An agreement for the sale

of X was entered into, the price to be payable in installments, and
the ownership

of X to pass only on the completion of these pay-

ments. The possession was to be In Harrison while the payments
of the installments were being made.
Another automobile than X, (we shall call it Y), has been delivered to Harrison. He has found it to be different from, and very
inferior to X. Before making this discovery he has apparently paid
two installments of $50 each. After making it, he refuses to pay
any more. He claims the return of the $100 paid as a precondition
to the return of the Y automobile.
We do not see that he should be compelled to redeliver the car
until there Is a redelivery of the money. The circumstances, we
think, entitle him to a lien on the car until repayment of the $100
has been tendered.
Harrison Is not rescinding the contract. He finds no fault
with It. He complains simply that the pretended performance of
the contract by Hoffman was no performance; that a fraudulent
substitution of Y for X was perpetrated, he not knowing It at the
time of acceptance of Y and paying the $100.
We do not realize the relevancy of the remark in Stern vs.
Haven, 22 Super. 164, that on the discovery of the substitution,
Harrison had to elect either to rescind or not, and that, if he did
not rescind, he must pay the installments or lose possession; and,
if he rescinded, he must return the car and be content to "demand"
the installments paid. He is not attempting a recission. We think
he was entitled to retain the car until the installments paid were
tendered back.
We must therefore reach a conclusion different from that of
the learned court below, and its judgment must be reversed with
v. f. d. n.
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WARREN v. TOWNSEND
Contracts for Sale of Land-Stipulation for Liquidated Damage*Waiver of Such Stipulation-Specific Performance of the
Contract
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Warren, owning land in Baltimore, contractMd to sell it to
Townsend for $2000, payable in quarterly Installments of $200. The
contract said: "In case of any default by Townsend In the payment of any installment for two weeks, all his right under the contract shall cease and the money already paid by him shall be reAfter paying $1000,
tained by Warren as liquidated damages."
Townsend ceased to pay. Although six months have elapsed since
the last payment, Warren now sues for the remainlng $1000.
Townsend defends, that having lost all rights under the contract,
he is discharged from the duty of making further payments.
Miss Stroh, for plaintiff.
Wise, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
O'Donnell, J. The contention of the defendant's counsel Is
that the forfeiture of the $1000 was to be the exclusive remedy
and the defendant having lost all his rights under the contract, the
plaintiff. cannot now seek to enforce that contract.
However, the defendant being in default, cannot set up his
own wrong to work a rescission of the contract.
Justice Porter has laid down the law on this question In a
case on all fours with the present one. He says: "Covenants that
the contract shall become void or that the estate shall cease and
terminate on failure by the grantee or lessee to pay at the time
specified are not self operating and do not make the contract void
except at the option of the grantor or lessor."
Cape May Real Estate Company vs. Henderson, 42 Superior
1, affirmed. 231 Pa. 82.
If -a covenant does not provide by clear, precise and unequivocal language that the purchaser may terminate it by his own
default, such effect will not be given it. Korman vs. Trainer, 258
Pa. 362.
That legal effect, no matter what form or cumulation of
phrases be used can only be changed by an express stipulation
that the contract shall be voidable at the option of either party.
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No such stipulation appears In this case. Cochran vs. Pew, 159
Pa. 184.
The provision is that upon default by the defendant, "all his
rights under the contract shall cease, and the money already paid
by him shall be retained by Warren as liquidated damages." There
Is nothing to indicate that it was the intention of the parties that
the defendant should be released from his liability upon the contract. This was manifestly a covenant inserted for the benefit of
the grantor to -nable him to secure the performance of the contract. The effect was to give the plaintiff, upon default by the defendant, the right of election to either assert and enforce forfeiture or to insist upon performance of the contract.
There is no doubt that the grantor may waive the remedy
either expressly or by estoppel arising from acts tending to mislead the grantee or lull him into the belief that strict performance
will not be exacted. In thIs case there Is no evidence of such acts
and In our opinion a delay of six months was not unreasonably
long. Vito vs. Birkel. 209 Pa. 206.
This contract was to be performed in the State of Maryland
but the laws of a sister State must be proved as facts and in the
absence of allegations or evidence to the contrary must be presumed to be the same as that of the forum.
Cape May Real Estate
Co. vs. Henderson, 231 Pa. 83; Musser vs. Stauffer, 178 Pa. 99; Van
Auken vs. Dunning, 81 Pa. 464.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The interpretation put upon the contract by the learned court
below, is Incontestable.
It reserved to the vendor the right, but
did not put on him the duty, of regarding the interest of the vendee, on his own default, as ended. The vendor waives his right
and may then compel performance of his promise by the vendee.
The judgment is affirmed.

REX vs. THOMPSON
Stockbrokers--Liability for Purchase Price on Sale of Stock for a
Customer--277 Pa 282 Approved
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

Rex delivered certlificates of stock in a corporation, of the par
value of $2000, to Thompson, a stock-broker, in order that he might
sell them at not less than $2200. After a time Thompson reported
that he had sold the shares. A month later he stated that he was
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not able to collect the money from the vendee who had returned
the certificates. This is an action for $2200.
OPINION

OF THEO

COURT

Behman, T. It is essential to a recovery in this case that the
plaintiff show that not only the stock-broker engaged in the business of a selling and purchasing stock, but that he also had the
legal capacity to be a guarantor for the price of the stock sold.
According to 9 Corpus Juris 511, Sec. 12, we find that his position is greater than that of a mere agent. Not only does he perform the duties of an agent, but likewise the role of a trustee is
enacted by him, insuring to his principal the solvency of the purchaser.
The counsel for the defense advances the argument that the
stock-broker is not a guarantor ind is liable only upon failure to
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the performance of his
duties. In support of such contention is cited the recent Pa. case
Vollmer vs. Newburger and al., 277 Pa. 282. Upon perusal of this
case the court finds that the judge admitted that reasonable care
and diligence would tend to disprove the fact that a sale had been
made, but the admission of such a fact does not confirm the idea
that a stock-broker does not guarantee the solvency of the purchaser.
The case of Vollmer vs. Newburger proceeds
as follows:
"Where a broker sells stock and notifies his customer that it has
been sold, he becomes liable for the price. He may prove also in
fact that no sale has been made but this must be proved by competent evidence. If this cannot be shown, then the stock-broker
is liable for the price."
Applying such dicta to the case at bar
we can readily determine whether or not the defendant should be
excused from payment of the price.
The plaintiff in the case at bar has made out a prime facle
case having shown that there was an order to sell, delivery of the
stock, and notice to him by the stock broker that such stock had
been sold. It then devolves upon the defendant to show cause why
the money was not collected from the purchaser. In the case at
bar he has failed to show that the report of the sale to the principal was a mistake on his part. Not only that, admitting that It
was a mistake, the defendant has failed to exercise due diligence
and care in acquainting the principal of such.
Therefore due to the stringent measures necessary for the
protection of the public in such cases and the great responsibility
resting upon stock-brokers, the court has no recourse but to enforce strictly the rule that a stock-broker is primarily liable for
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the price of the stocks sold and since there has been advanced no
competent evidence by the defendant, we find for the plaintiff for
the sum of $2200.
;udgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When a stock-broker undertakes to sell, and sells stock, he
guarantees that it will be paid for, and he is primarily liable to the
client. Vollmer vs. Newberger, 277 Pa. 282.
After a sale, the broker cannot escape liability for the price
because the vendee is unable to pay the price. The broker may, if
he will, cancel the liability of the buyer, but he cannot cancel his
liability to his oustomer.
Was there a sale? The broker, defendant, "reported that he
had sold the shares."
That is adequate evidence of the sale. Nor
is there any contradiction of this report. A month later the defendant said, what? That he had not sold? No, but that he had
not been able to collect the money from the vendee who had returned the certificates.
This latter communication 'was not contradictory of the earlier. It shows the consummation of the sale
but the failure to pay the price.
The broker did wisely in taking back the certificates when he found that payment could not
be realized but he did not cancel his guaranty of payment to Rex.
his customer.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

